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Employment policies like reducing the workweek, subsidizing the wage or
subsidizing employment have been proposed in some countries as a way to
increase employment. In France a 35 hour workweek has been introduced
and, in other countries like Germany, unions have imposed similar measures
in some sectors. In Spain, permanent contracts are promoted through wage
subsidies and in other European countries a number of di®erent subsidy
schemes are in place. In the academic literature Fitzgerald (1996), Fitzger-
ald (1998), and Marim¶ on and Zilibotti (2000) amongst others have stud-
ied the implications of imposing legal restrictions on the number of hours
worked. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) and Cardullo and van der Linden
(2006) have used the search and matching framework to analyze the e®ect
of employment subsidies and Orszag and Snower (2003) have compared the
relative e®ectiveness of hiring and wage subsidies.
In this paper I compare the macroeconomic e®ects of taxing overtime
and using two kinds of subsidies, an employment and a wage subsidy, in a
general equilibrium model. Since these policies make employment cheaper
relative to hours the results will crucially depend on the degree of substi-
tutability between the workweek length and employment. I use business
cycle °uctuations of hours and employment to have a precise measurement
of this degree of substitutability. In the model the two margins of labor
will be imperfect substitutes due to the following assumptions : (i) team-
work and (ii) additional frictions modelled as commuting costs subject to
congestion.
Team-work implies that a plant can only be operated when all its workers
are present, and hence, that the length of the workweek is common to every
worker in the plant. Consequently, when a plant changes its workweek, the
amount of capital available to each worker does not change. On the other
hand, when a plant changes the size of its labor force, the amount of capital
available to each worker also changes. This implies that workweek length
and employment are imperfect substitutes, inducing a form of decreasing
returns to employment that do not apply to the workweek. Moreover, it
also implies that the wage-rate is a non-linear function of the number of
hours worked.








stitutes, I follow Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) and model them as commuting
costs subject to congestion. Commuting implies that workers have to use
a certain amount of time before they start working. Moreover, commut-
ing costs are assumed to be increasing in aggregate employment, that is,
subject to congestion1. As in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) this assumption
should not be taken literally. The advantage over alternative mechanisms
is that it allows the use of the representative agent abstraction. Kydland
and Prescott (1991), Cho and Cooley (1994), Bils and Cho (1994) and Cho
and Rogerson (1988) use other ways to get adjustment along both margins,
hours and bodies2. The imperfect substitutability between employment and
hours per worker introduces a non convexity in the choice set that I deal
with, following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), by assuming that agents
have access to employment lotteries.
Except for those two features, the model economy is a standard busi-
ness cycle model without overtime taxes or subsidies. I calibrate a baseline
model economy so that the average duration of its workweek is 40 hours and
so that it mimics the main features of the U.S. economy. In particular, I
calibrate the model to the relative volatility of employment and hours per
worker to get a reliable estimate of the substitutability between the two
margins of labor.3 Next, I introduce and compare several employment poli-
cies. I ¯rst report the tax-rate on overtime that reduces the workweek from
40 to 35 hours in steady-state as in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003). A 12%
tax-rate achieves this end and brings about a 7% increase in steady-state
employment, a 10:2% decrease in steady-state output and a 4:2% decrease
in steady-state productivity. Then, I look for the employment and wage
subsidy that brings about the same increase in steady-state employment. I
¯nd that an employment subsidy performs better in terms of output, pro-
ductivity, wages and welfare. The wage subsidy turns out to be very costly
from a ¯scal point of view, 12:7% of output versus 4:57% of output in the
employment subsidy experiment. In addition, I study the implications of a
related and very controversial policy: the recently proposed increase in the
legal workweek till 60 hours. Finally, I also compute the transition between
steady states of the three model economies in order to measure the welfare
costs implied by these policies. I ¯nd that these welfare costs are very sig-
ni¯cant. Speci¯cally, they are at least 0.6% of average consumption on a
°ow basis, which is a large number as far as welfare calculations go.








in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) to compute the equilibria of non{convex
business cycle economies where the Second Welfare Theorem does not hold.4
Computing equilibria directly is burdensome because households must know
the wage function in order to compute their decisions in a model where
wages are non-linear functions of hours. These wage functions are part of
the ¯xed-point problem that must be solved to compute the equilibrium.
These techniques are not easily applied to the characterization of equilibria
with all kinds of frictions.
There are some other papers related to this one. I use the distinction
between hours and bodies used in Ehrenberg (1971), and later in Kydland
and Prescott (1991), Fitzgerald (1995) and Fitzgerald (1998). I also build
on the work of Prescott and Townsend (1984), Hansen (1985), Rogerson
(1988), Prescott and R¶ ³os-Rull (1992), Kydland and Prescott (1991) and,
especially, on Hornstein and Prescott (1993). All these papers use lotteries
to get around non-convexities in general equilibrium macroeconomic models.
Section 2 describes the model and the use of lotteries to implement its re-
cursive competitive equilibrium. I also adapt the model to include overtime
taxation, wage and employment subsidies. Section 3 describes how to map
the model to data. Section 4 reports the results for the baseline model, for
several employment policies and the transition. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In Section 2.1 I describe households and preferences and then technology in
Section 2.2. In Sections 2.3{ 2.3.3 I describe the contracts that agents use
and the problems that they solve. In Section 2.4 I go on to de¯ne equilibrium
recursively in a way that is suited for computation. I then expand the
economy to include overtime taxes in Section 2.5, an employment subsidy








2.1 Households and Preferences









where ct is consumption and `t is leisure in period t. The instantaneous
utility function is strictly concave and satis¯es the Inada conditions. Finally,
¯ 2 (0;1) is the subjective time discount factor.
An individual's time endowment in each period is one. The amount of
time that can be allocated to work is 1¡`¡´(N), where ´(N) > 0 measures
the amount of time required for commuting to work every period that the
individual is employed, and where N is aggregate employment. I assume
that there is congestion which creates a negative externality in employment.
In particular, I assume that ´(N) > 0, and ´0(N) > 0. Notice that `(h;N)
is not a continuous function since if hours worked are zero, no commuting
is needed. This introduces a non-convexity. We will see in detail below
how agents deal with the non-convexity. For technical reasons I de¯ne an
underlying consumption possibility set C = f[0;¹ c];[0;1]g, where ¹ c is an
upper bound in consumption that is non-binding.5
2.2 Plant's Technology
Production takes place in plants of which there may be a large number.
Moreover, new plants can be opened at zero costs. Plants are operated
during a number of hours that is the same for all workers. Plants also use
capital and they are restricted to have one shift.6 We can write the plant's
production function f as
f(z;h;k;n) = z h» k1¡µ nµ (2)
where h denotes the workweek, n employment in the plant and k the amount
of capital in the plant.7 Variable z represents total factor productivity. I use









Note that given the workweek, plants are subject to constant returns to
scale. When » = µ, we have the standard Cobb-Douglas technology where
total hours and not its decomposition in hours per worker and employment
is what matters. When » = 1, the technology is linear in hours and we
have an extreme case of team production, where workers are not subject
to fatigue (an increase in the workers' workweek results in an increase of
output of the same proportion).
2.3 Contracts
I assume complete markets. In this economy with non-convexities, there
are e±ciency gains from the introduction of lotteries.8 The non-convexities
apply only to the labor market, so I only need to specify lotteries for the
labor contract. Moreover, rather than having plants buy measures of agents,
as for example in Prescott and R¶ ³os-Rull (1992), I ¯nd that it is easier to
describe the economy by posing an, otherwise irrelevant, insurance ¯rm that
contracts in measures with households and that contracts in real quantities
with the operators of plants. In the absence of distortionary taxation and
the commuting externality, the equilibrium would have been optimal under
this market structure.9
2.3.1 The ¯rms' problem
To see the nonlinearity of the wage as a function of the workweek, I start
¯xing the workweek, h, and I use wh to denote the salary paid to a worker




z h» k1¡µ nµ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n wh (3)
where r is the rental rate of capital (the interest rate). There is free entry,
which implies that ¯rms have zero pro¯ts. Moreover, there are constant
returns to scale, so we can normalize the size of a ¯rm to have one employee
that works h hours. This means that for any given r, we can solve
max
k
z h» k1¡µ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ wh (4)








I then determine the salary for workweek h as the value of wh that
satis¯es
0 = z h» [k(z;h;r)]1¡µ ¡ k(z;h;r)(r + ±) ¡ wh (5)
using the zero-pro¯t condition.
In fact, we can do this for all h and obtain the wage rate wh as a function
of the interest rate. As we can see from equation (5) this is a non-linear
function of h. In sum, plants can be indexed by their workweek and their
capital per worker.
To describe the number of existing one-worker plants at any point in
time we can use a measure ª de¯ned not over C, but just over its second
component, the workweeks. Let ª(B) be the measure of plants of size one
worker that operates a workweek of size h 2 B ½ [0;1] for any Borel set B.
Aggregating over ¯rms we get that aggregate output can be written as
Z
[0;1]
z h» k(z;r;h)1¡µ ª(dh) (6)











Let C be an appropriate family of subsets of C, say, its Borel ¾{algebra.
Households choose probabilities over C. Let M be the space of signed mea-
sures that includes the probabilities. The per-period consumption possibility
set of households is indexed by aggregate employment in the period:
X(N) = fx 2 M : x is a probability; i:e: x ¸ 0; and x(C) = 1; (9)








where the last condition is the requirement that in no case working hours
plus commuting time is greater than the time endowment.






Note that function U is linear in x. The price of x is given by a linear
function,
R
C q(c;h) dx, where q(c;h) gives the value of consuming c units
and working h hours with probability one. A detailed discussion of q can be
found in Section 2.3.3.
Moreover, households own assets a, and choose savings that I denote by
a0. Since working does not have dynamic implications (a period later agents
with wealth a0 are identical regardless of what was the labor situation today)
all agents with the same assets choose the same savings independently of
the outcome of the lottery. These considerations imply that the budget
constraint of the household is
Z
C
q(c;h) dx + a0 = (1 + r) a:
I can de¯ne an indirect current return function R that takes as given the
saving behavior of the household and solves for the optimal x. The static







q(c;h) dx + a0 = (1 + r) a (12)
where both the objective and the constraint are linear. I write x(a;N;q;r;a0)
as the optimal choice for a household with a assets, that saves a0, when
aggregate employment is N, and prices are given by functions q and r.
2.3.3 The intermediate insurance companies
These companies have zero pro¯ts and their only role is to insure the house-
holds. They deal with both households and ¯rms and they choose signed








the rights to working time that they sell to plants at price wh and provide
to consumers the consumption implied by the lottery. These insurance ¯rms
contract with a large number of households which allows a law of large num-
bers to hold (see Uhlig (1996)), which precludes any aggregate uncertainty
over the realizations of the lotteries.












This problem has only a solution if the pricing function is such that its
consumption component only depends on the ¯rst moment of the measure










wh x([0;¹ c];dh) (14)
and, hence, I can rewrite the households' budget constraint as
Z
C
c x(dc;[0;1]) + a0 = (1 + r) a +
Z
C
wh x([0;¹ c];dh) (15)
Accordingly, I rede¯ne the current return of the household after the static
optimization problem described in equation (11) as R(a;N;wh;r;a0) and the
lottery choice as x(a;N;wh;r;a0). An important property of x(a;N;wh;r;a0)
given the properties of wh and q is that it has positive mass in at most two
points10, one of which is fc;0g where c 2 [0;¹ c]. It is easy to see why this is
the case. Strict concavity of function u, and convexity of the choice set for
h > 0 shows that households prefer to get a point with mass on only one h
than another point with mass in more than one point with positive h and
the same mean.
So, the solution to the household problem can only be one of the follow-
ing three possibilities. One, there is positive mass in only one point with
h > 0; two, there is positive mass only in h = 0; and three, there is positive
mass in two points, one with h = 0 and one with h > 0. The use of a pro-
duction function that satis¯es the Inada conditions guarantees that in these
economies there is always mass at some h > 0. I denote by h(a;N;wh;r;a0)









2.4 The recursive problem
Once I have set the within periods contracting problems, I can turn to de-
¯ne equilibrium for the economy. I will do so recursively. I start by de¯ning
the aggregate state variables of the economy. These are those variables
that are needed to evaluate and forecast all prices. For this economy, they
are total factor productivity z and aggregate capital K. The household's
individual asset level a is also part of the individual state vector. In or-
der for a household to solve its maximization problem it has to be able to
compute the values for fr;wh;K0;Ng. I assume that the household uses
functions fÁr;Áwh;GK;GNg to do so. These functions map the aggregate
state variables into the variables that the household needs to know to solve
its maximization problem. The value function in expression (16) is indexed
by these functions for clarity. In later expressions I omit the indices.
v(z;K;a;Á;G) = max






r = Ár(z;K) (18)
wh = Áw(z;K;h) (19)
K0 = GK(z;K) (20)
N = GN(z;K) (21)
H = GH(z;K) (22)
Let a0 = ga(z;K;a;Á;G) denote the solution to this problem. Substi-
tution of this solution in (11) yields x(z;K;a;Á;G), and given that this
problem puts mass in at most two points, it also yields h = gh(z;K;a;Á;G)
and n = gn(z;K;a;Á;G).
De¯nition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of decision rules
for households fga;gh;gng, a value function v, functions for aggregate vari-
ables fGK;GH;GNg, for the interest rate Ár(z;K), a wage schedule func-
tion Áw(z;K;h), a measure of ¯rms ª(z;K), and a capital renting policy of
the plants k(z;r;h) such that i) the decision rules and value function sat-
isfy (16), ii) the agent is representative, i.e. ga(z;K;K;Á;G) = GK(z;K),
gh(z;K;K;Á;G) = GH(z;K) and gn(z;K;K;Á;G) = GN(z;K), iii) plants








iv) the labor market clears, i.e., ª has mass in only one point with pos-
itive hours worked which is given by GH(z;K) and ª[z;K;GH(z;K)] =
GN(z;K), and v) the market for capital clears, K = ª[z;K;GH(z;K)] =
_ k[z;Ár(z;K);GH(z;K)].
A steady state for a deterministic version of this economy (a ¯xed value of
total factor productivity ¹ z) is just a number K¤ such that, when substituted
in the above general de¯nition of recursive equilibrium, satis¯es
K¤ = GK(¹ z;K¤); (23)
in addition to all the requirements above.
2.5 Overtime taxation
An overtime tax is a policy ¿(¹ h;h) such that if h > ¹ h then ¯rms have to pay
¿(¹ h;h)¢ ^ wh to the government, where ^ wh is the total payment that the ¯rm
has to incur, ^ wh = wh + ¿(¹ h;h) ¢ ^ wh. Equation (3) becomes
max
k;n
z h» k1¡µ nµ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n[ wh + ¿(¹ h;h) ¢ ^ wh] (24)
Equations (4) and (5) also change in a similar fashion. An important feature
of the computational procedure is that all the relevant objects that the agent
face are di®erentiable. Therefore, I can use the ¯rst derivatives to help
characterize the solution. To this end, I use a function ¿ that is di®erentiable
at h = ¹ h. The properties of this function are that ¿(¹ h;h) = 0 if h · ¹ h,
¿(¹ h;h) > 0 if h > ¹ h, limh!1 = ¹ ¿,
@¿(¹ h;h)
@h is non decreasing. Note that given
these assumptions, for the tax to have any e®ects, ¹ h has to be lower than
the target of hours worked.11
All the proceeds of the overtime tax are redistributed lump sum to the
households. This changes equation (12) to
Z
C
q(c;h) dx + a0 = (1 + r) a + T (25)
where T are the transfers.
In addition to the changes in the pro¯t function of ¯rms and in the budget








the government to the de¯nition of equilibrium. This condition is simply
that
T(z;K) = ¿[¹ h;GH(z;K)] (26)
2.6 Subsidy proportional to n
A subsidy proportional to employment is a policy n¼ such that ¯rms receive
¼ from the government for every worker they hire, where n(wh ¡ ¼) is the
total payment that the ¯rm has to incur. Equation (3) becomes
max
k;n
z h» k1¡µ nµ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n(wh ¡ ¼) (27)
Equations (4) and (5) also change in a similar fashion. Given that x has
positive mass in at most two points, for convenience I rewrite the static
household problem in a simpler way
max
c0;c1;n
nU(c1;1 ¡ h ¡ ´) + (1 ¡ n)U(c0;1) (28)
s.t. nc1 + (1 ¡ n)c0 + a0 = (1 + r)a + wh n ¡ N ¼ (29)
where n denotes individual employment and N denotes aggregate employ-
ment, so that N ¼ stands for a lumpsum tax.
2.7 Subsidy proportional to nwh
A subsidy proportional to the salary mass is a policy nwh¼ such that ¯rms
receive wh¼ from the government for every worker they hire, where n(wh(1¡
¼)) is the total payment that the ¯rm has to incur. Equation (3) becomes
max
k;n
z h» k1¡µ nµ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n(wh(1 ¡ ¼)) (30)
Equations (4) and (5) also change in a similar fashion. The household prob-
lem is the same as in the previous section except for the lumpsum tax, which








3 Mapping the Model to Data
Except for the team work and the commuting cost assumption, the model is
a standard business cycle model. Team work is described by the parameter
». I have chosen the economy to be midway between the standard Cobb-
Douglas case where » = µ and the strict fatigue-less case where » = 112.
Function ´(N) describes the commuting cost externality
´(N) = ANN¸ (31)
The rest is standard. I have chosen the time period to be a quarter and I
have assumed that household preferences can be described by the following










where 0 < ® < 1 and ¾ > 0. The model has 10 parameters. The measure-
ments of the parameters that characterize the process for the Solow residual,
the auto{regressive coe±cient ½ and the variance of the shock ¾², are taken
from Prescott (1986). Apart from parameter » the model has seven ad-
ditional parameters: µ, ±, ¯, ®, ¾, AN and ¸, whose values are shown in
Table I. The conditions to set these seven parameters are:
1. A labor share of 64%.
2. A steady state yearly interest rate of 4%.
3. A steady state consumption to output ratio of .75.
4. A steady state fraction of the working-age population who work of
75%. See Kydland and Prescott (1991) for a discussion of this choice.
5. A 40 hour workweek. I assume that out of the 168 hours in each week,
68 of them are devoted either to sleeping or personal care. This implies
that workers work 40% of their time. See Cooley and Prescott (1995)
for a discussion of this choice.
6. The relative volatility of hours and bodies is .5 as in the U.S. data.
See Kydland and Prescott (1991) or Cooley and Prescott (1995).13









Table I: Baseline Economy Parameters.
» AN ¸ ® ¾ ± µ ¯
.85 .35 6.75 .33 1.5 .025 .64 .99
4 Main Findings
Section 4.1 reports the steady state implications of imposing an overtime
tax policy. Section 4.2 reports the steady state implications of introducing
an employment and a wage subsidy and compare these results with those
obtained with an overtime tax. Section 4.3 studies the implications of a
related and very controversial policy: the recently proposed increase in the
legal workweek till 60 hours. Finally, Section 4.4 reports the welfare impli-
cations and the transition paths of these three model economies.
4.1 An overtime tax
Table II shows, along the steady state of the baseline economy, the steady
state of an economy where the overtime tax policy achieves a reduction in
the workweek from 40 to 35 hours. To ease comparisons the table includes
the percentage change for each relevant variable (%var), as well as the per-
centage change relative to the hours per worker percentage change (%var
%h ).
A tax rate on overtime of 12% induces households to reduce hours worked
by 12.5%, increases employment by 7:04%, and decreases output and pro-
ductivity by 10:2% and 4:2%, respectively. Note that due to the reduction
in productivity, the reduction in the salary is larger than the reduction in
hours per worker.
4.2 An employment and a wage subsidy
Table III shows the steady state results of introducing an employment and








Table II: An overtime tax.
Economy ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary wh 0.69 0.58 -16.3 -1.30
those subsidies that generate a similar employment increase.
An employment subsidy of 0.045 reduces hours worked by 6:3% and in-
creases employment by 7:0% since this policy makes bodies relatively cheaper
to hours. Contrary to what happened in the overtime experiment, total
hours increase because the reduction in hours per worker is more than com-
pensated by the increase in employment. This implies a smaller decrease in
total output, 1:9% versus 10:2%, and also a smaller reduction in productiv-
ity, 2:1% versus 4:2%. Still, total output, capital and productivity decrease
because, due to the team work assumption, it is more pro¯table to pay for
extra hours than hiring an additional worker. The fact that wages are non-
linear functions of hours and the decrease in the workweek and productivity
explain the fall in the salary. However, given the lower decrease in hours
per worker and productivity, the reduction in the salary is also lower, 1:8%
versus 16:3%, than in the overtime experiment.
The wage subsidy that generates the same employment increase implies
very di®erent results. Given employment, the subsidy grows more than
proportional with hours because of the non-linearity on hours of the wage
function. In fact, increasing the subsidy results in increases in both the
workweek and employment, so that total hours, the steady state capital
and output increase considerably. Productivity increases slightly despite
the increase in the workweek and employment. Regarding the salary, it also
increases given the increase in the workweek, the nonlinearity of the wage








Table III: Employment and wage subsidy
Type of subsidy ¼N ¼wHN
Economy ¼ = 0 ¼ = 0:045 %var ¼ = 0 ¼ = 0:165 %var
Hours per worker 40.0 37.5 -6.34 40.0 41.5 3.65
Employment 0.75 0.80 7.01 0.75 0.80 7.02
Total hours 30.0 30.1 0.23 30.0 33.3 11.0
Output 1.00 0.98 -1.86 1.00 1.12 12.2
Productivity 1.00 0.98 -2.09 1.00 1.01 1.16
Salary wh 0.69 0.68 -1.77 0.69 0.87 25.6
To summarize, I ¯nd that subsidizing employment can achieve the same
employment increase than taxing overtime but at a lower cost in terms of
output, productivity and wages. This is particularly important because of
the di±culty in implementing policies that imply downward wage °exibility,
as it is the case in the overtime experiment. Of course, there is a trade-o®.
Subsidizing employment implies a budgetary outlay that has to be ¯nanced
through higher taxes or debt. These costs have to be confronted with the
bene¯ts of having more employment with similar wages and, as result, higher
consumption and welfare (see Section 4.4) than in the overtime experiment.
The wage subsidy that achieves the same employment increase turns out
to be almost three times costlier than the employment subsidy. Table IV
compares the results of two subsidies, a 0.045 employment subsidy and a
0.065 wage subsidy, that cost the same in terms of output. The wage subsidy
generates a much lower employment increase, 2:7% versus 7:0%.
4.3 Increasing the legal workweek
The goal of this section is to quantify the implications for productivity and
employment of a related and very controversial policy: the recently proposed
increase in the legal workweek till 60 hours. For that purpose I need to
introduce a new element in the model to induce cross{sectional variation
of workweeks across plants such that, subject to a positive plant speci¯c
shock, a ¯rm may ¯nd it pro¯table to increase the working week above the








Table IV: An equal cost employment and wage subsidy
Type of subsidy ¼N ¼wHN
Economy ¼ = 0 ¼ = 0:045 %var ¼ = 0 ¼ = 0:065 %var
Hours per worker 40.0 37.5 -6.34 40.0 40.6 1.48
Employment 0.75 0.80 7.01 0.75 0.77 2.65
Total hours 30.0 30.1 0.23 30.0 31.3 4.17
Output 1.00 0.98 -1.86 1.00 1.05 4.67
Productivity 1.00 0.98 -2.09 1.00 1.01 0.47
Salary wh 0.69 0.68 -1.77 0.69 0.75 9.05
¯rms to adjust their labor input to temporary changes in productivity (or
demand).
To model the importance of plant level °exibility, I assume i.i.d. transi-
tory shocks to plant level productivity, revealed after the workers have been
hired but before production takes place, and independent from the econ-
omy wide productivity shock.15 Consequently, the only margin that can be
used to exploit this additional productivity change is to vary the plant's
workweek. The new plant level production function is given by
z sh» k1¡µ nµ (33)
where all variables are as before except for the plant speci¯c shock, s. The
shock takes only ¯nitely many values s 2 fs1;¢¢¢ ;smsg and is drawn from
probability distribution °s.
This change requires the indexation of agents' choices by the possible
realizations of the shock, resulting in
X(N) = fx1;¢¢¢ ;xms : xs 2 M : xs is a probability, i:e: xs ¸ 0; xs (C) = 1; (34)
xs([0;¹ c];f0g) is the same for all s;
if h 2 (0;1]; and xs ([0;¹ c];[h;1]) > 0; then h · 1 ¡ ´(N)g:
Note that all I am adding is that the employment probability cannot depend
on the idiosyncratic shock of the plant. From the point of view of the ¯rm,













°s s h(s)» ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ wfh(s)g (35)
with solution given by k(z;fh(s)g;r). The zero pro¯t condition requires
that for each vector fh(s)g, the salary wfh(s)g satis¯es
0 = z [k(z;fh(s)g;r)]1¡µ X
s
°s s h(s)» ¡ k(z;fh(s)g;r)(r + ±) ¡ wfh(s)g
(36)
The rest of the changes to adapt the model to the case with idiosyncratic
shocks to ¯rms is a tedious minor variation of the equations described above
and I omit them for brevity.
4.3.1 Mapping the heterogeneous workweeks economy to data
To parameterize the model I use an equal probability three-valued i.i.d shock.
These means that I have three new parameters to set and three new statis-
tics to match. I take these statistics from the cross-sectional distribution of
workweeks of individuals as reported by the European Commission in \Em-
ployment in Europe Report 2007". One third of workers work between 35-39
hours a week, another third work 40-44 hours, and the remaining third work
45-55 hours. These are the three statistics to replicate and the associated
parameters to be determined are the values of the shocks.
The other targets of the model remain the same as in Section 3 except for
the average number of hours worked and the employment rate. The average
number of hours worked by men in their main job in the EU-15 in 2005 is
40.7 and the men employment rate in the same period is 71:4%. Concerning
the parameters, the two that change values are ¾ and ®.
4.3.2 Findings
I next perform the following experiment. I look for the tax on overtime such
that in steady state the maximum amount of hours worked is the legal 48








Table V: New economy parameters
» AN ¸ ® ¾ ± µ ¯
.85 .35 6.75 .3 1.1 .025 .64 .99
turns out to be approximately 60 hours in steady state. This tax reduction
can be assimilated to the recently proposed increase in the legal workweek
till 60 hours. From this exercise we can learn about the productivity losses
and employment gains of maintaining the actual legislation.
Table VI shows that a 12:5% reduction in the overtime tax induces house-
holds to increase mean hours worked by 10:2% (from 40.7 to 45). This is a
large number since the tax does not a®ect everybody , only those ¯rms that
need to exploit the positive productivity change by increasing the workweek.
In addition, the policy reduces employment by 7%, and increases output and
productivity by 6:7% and 4%, respectively. Note that due to the increase in
productivity, the increase in the salary is larger than the increase in hours
per worker.
I also computed the standard deviation of hours to see the implications
of the policy for the intensive margin. The increase in the volatility of hours
turns out to be 39%. This is not surprising since the tax punishes in the
margin only the plants with long workweeks. I fact, the policy changes the
cross-sectional distribution from 48:5, 39:8 and 34.0 hours per week to 54.6,
45.9 and 34.3 hours.
4.4 The transition
An assessment of a policy cannot be carried out based on steady state com-
parisons since the economies under consideration have di®erent initial con-
ditions. In order to assess the implications of a policy, I take the steady









Table VI: Increase in the legal workweek
Economy ¿ = 0:125 ¿ = 0 %var %var
%h
Average hours 40.7 45.0 10.2 1
Employment 71.4 66.5 -6.9 -0.67
Total hours 26.7 26.0 -2.7 -0.26
Output 1.00 1.07 6.7 0.65
Productivity 1.00 1.04 3.9 0.38
Salary 0.63 0.72 14.6 1.42
Figure 1 shows the transition paths for the main aggregate variables that
I am interested in for an economy in which I impose the 12:0% overtime tax
(as in Section 4.1). To make the picture clearer, I normalize all variables
so that in the steady state of an economy without taxes their value is one.
The ¯rst thing to note is that the adjustment of most variables is very fast.
Indeed, hours and employment immediately jump to almost their ¯nal value.
Only capital adjusts slowly as there is deccumulation, and output and the
salary go down slowly following the path of capital. The consumptions of
both the employed and the unemployed also fall and so does the utility of
the representative agent because, apart from the consumption decrease, the
ex-ante probability of ending up working is higher. For the same reason, the
utility of the representative agent is also lower in the economy with a 0.045
employment subsidy. On the contrary, in the .165 wage subsidy economy
consumption is higher than in the baseline, both for the employed and the
non-employed, since hours, employment, capital and, therefore, output are
higher. However, the utility of the representative consumer is also lower
than in the baseline because the negative e®ect of having a higher ex-ante
probability of ending up working more than compensate the increase in
consumption.
The computation of the transition allows the computation of the welfare
cost of a policy. I compute the welfare cost as the proportional decrease
in consumption (both for the employed and the unemployed) with respect
to the steady state without the policy that would leave agents indi®erent
to implementing the policy. Before reporting the number I state a major























































substitutability between hours per worker and employment. Recall that in
the model there is an externality based commuting cost. As a result, the
increase in aggregate employment increases the commuting time and reduces
utility. If I had modelled the economy with a di®erent type of friction, the
utility cost of the policy would have been very di®erent, and probably much
smaller, as the friction does not need to have utility costs as large as those
imposed by the externality. Henceforth, the welfare cost that I compute
is likely to overstate the actual welfare costs of the policy. The drop in
average consumption that makes agents indi®erent between the previous
situation and the implementation of the policy ranges from 8:0% in the
economy with the 12% overtime tax and the 0:165 wage subsidy to 8:5%
in the economy with the 0:045 employment subsidy. Because of the above
considerations regarding the friction, I also computed the welfare costs that
would come up if I do not take into account the changes in commuting time
that are imposed by the externality. In this case, the welfare costs are of
a smaller order of magnitude, 1:0% of average consumption in the overtime
tax economy and 0:6% in the economy with the employment subsidy16. I
think these last numbers provide a better assessment of the welfare costs of
these policies because they are likely to be more in line with what would
have resulted from modelling the frictions in the labor market di®erently.
I want to make the point that welfare calculations usually yield very small
numbers due to the concavity of the utility function, and therefore even
0.6% of average consumption is a large welfare cost.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have compared the macroeconomic implications of taxing
overtime, subsidizing the wage and subsidizing employment in a dynamic
general equilibrium model where hours and bodies are imperfect substitutes
due to team work and an externality{based commuting cost. For ease of
comparison I have looked for policies that generate the same employment
increase and I have compared the implications of those policies for the work-
week, output, productivity and wages. Having a correct measurement of the
degree of substitutability between hours per worker and employment has
been crucial to give an accurate assessment of the employment gains since
these policies change the relative price of employment and hours. I have








In the baseline model economy, I found that a 12% tax on overtime
decreases the workweek from 40 to 35 hours, increases employment by 7%
and decreases productivity by 4:2%. Then, I looked for the employment
and wage subsidy that generated the same increase in steady-state employ-
ment and compared the changes in hours per worker, output, wages and
productivity. I found that an employment subsidy performs better in terms
of output, productivity and wages. This is particularly important because
of the di±culty in implementing policies that imply downward wage °ex-
ibility, as it is the case in the overtime experiment. Of course, there is a
trade-o®. Subsidizing employment implies a budgetary outlay that has to
be ¯nanced through higher taxes or debt. These costs have to be confronted
with the bene¯ts of having more employment with similar wages and, as re-
sult, higher consumption and welfare than in the overtime experiment. The
wage subsidy that achieved the same employment increase turned out to be
very costly from a ¯scal point of view.
I also studied the implications of a related and very controversial policy,
the recently proposed increase in the legal workweek till 60 hours, to learn
about the productivity losses and employment gains of maintaining the ac-
tual legislation. For that purpose I introduced a new element in the model
to induce cross{sectional variation of workweeks across plants such that,
subject to a positive plant speci¯c shock, a ¯rm may found it pro¯table to
increase the working week above the legal 48-hours. The increase in the le-
gal workweek increased mean hours worked substantially (from 40.7 to 45).
This is a large number since the tax does not a®ect everybody, only those
¯rms that need to exploit the positive productivity change by increasing
the workweek. The policy also reduced employment by 7%, and increased
output and productivity by 6:7% and 4%, respectively.
Finally, I computed the transition between steady states of the three
model economies in order to measure the welfare costs implied by these
policies. I found that these welfare costs are at least 0.6% of average con-
sumption, which is a large number as far as welfare calculations go.
There are some caveats to these ¯ndings. The ¯rst one arises from hav-
ing used commuting costs subject to congestion as the friction that stands
in for a variety of adjustment costs that are di±cult to model appropriately.
The second caveat has to do with the use of business cycle properties to cal-








between hours per worker and employment. There is no doubt that these
¯ndings are a®ected by these assumptions. In a di®erent paper (Osuna and
R¶ ³os-Rull (2003)) I performed some robustness exercises to give a sense of
the range of possible values for the main variables that I am looking at.
I found that the answers encountered under these alternative assumptions
are not very di®erent from those that arise in the baseline model economy.
Another major caveat which has to do with the fact that there are not dis-
tributional e®ects. That is, every agent, workers and non-workers, is worst
after these policies, not only ex-ante because everybody has a higher prob-
ability of ending up working, but also ex-post. The lack of distributional
issues in the model makes the implementation of these policies at least puz-
zling, since they are welfare reducing. The inclusion of some form of market
incompleteness would have given an insurance role to these policies and a
rationale to its implementation.
I see this contribution as an example of how to use this methodological
benchmark to accurately compare several employment policies in terms of
i) the trade-o®s between employment and hours, output, productivity and
wages, ii) the budgetary outlays and iii) the welfare costs. This benchmark
could also be used to study the e®ects of reducing child care costs or pro-
moting part-time work for the women employment rate, or to study the
e®ects of delaying or anticipating the age of retirement. I see the role of this
paper as an initial, not as a ¯nal formal discussion of the macroeconomic
implications of these kind of policies. Moreover, the model can be extended
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1. See Section 5.3 in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) where they show the
relevance of this externality assumption.
2. See Section 1 in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) for a review of this liter-
ature.
3. In Section 3 Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) discuss why this calibration
seems reasonable by comparing these estimates with those in direct
empirical studies. They also compare with Cho and Cooley (1994)
results (that use PSID data at a steady state frequency), and showed
that they are extremely similar, what lends support to their measure-
ments.
4. Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) describe in detail the computational method
used to solve this problem in their Appendix A.
5. See Prescott and R¶ ³os-Rull (1992) for a detailed explanation of why
we impose this upper bound and for why it is irrelevant.
6. While some advocates of workweek reduction policies might have in
mind gains in employment due to increases in the number of shifts, I
think that team{work is a more important feature in actual plants (see
Beers (2000) for a discussion of both, shift work and °exible schedules,
in recent U.S. data).
7. In a sense, this form of writing the plant production function is a
reduced form. I could rede¯ne h to be the hours worked by the worker
that works the least. However, given constant returns in bodies and
capital, the plants can split at no costs into units where all workers
work the same number of hours.
8. See Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and Prescott and R¶ ³os-Rull (1992)
for earlier applications of lotteries to labor contracts.
9. Obviously, the actual details of what types of ¯rms buy and sell these
lotteries do not matter. I could have chosen other arrangements with-
out changing the equilibrium allocations (see Prescott and R¶ ³os-Rull
(1992)).
10. Actually this is a property derived from a standard result in linear








11. See Appendix B and Fig.B1 in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) for details
of the tax function.
12. Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) explore alternative choices for this param-
eter as a robustness check.
13. A natural question in this context is to what extent can business cy-
cles variation be informative about the substitutability between hours
and employment, and how does it relate to alternative measurement
procedures that draw on microeconomic observations to calibrate. See
Section 3 in Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) for this discussion.
14. Osuna and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) explore alternative choices for the con-
muting cost as a robustness check.
15. A more theoretically consistent way to describe this would be to say
that it exists a time to hire restriction. The nature of the timing is
not dissimilar to that in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1990),
although, in that paper hours cannot adjust. This shock could be
interpreted as a demand shock, but it is simpler to specify it as a
plant speci¯c productivity shock.
16. It does not make any sense to compute this number for the economy
with the 0.165 wage subsidy because the policy is welfare improving.
27